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CURRENT INTE	LLIGENCE BU	LLETIN	
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CENTRAL INT	ELLIGENCE AG	ENCY	

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1. SOVIET OFFICIAL ASSERTS EAST GERMANS CONTROL EAST BERLIN

25X1A	The assertion by the Soviet commandant in Berlin, General Dibrova, that the German Democratic Republic is the sovereign authority in East Berlin
	oneng the way to Fast German efforts to interfere with

opens the way to East German efforts to interfere with Allied travel in East Berlin and to deal directly and officially with Britain, France, and the United States. Although in theory this would extend to East Berlin the restrictions on Allied access to East Germany, in practice East Berlin will probably continue for the time being to be more accessible, with only spot harassments. To date there is no sign that the Soviet action is intended as a challenge to Allied control of West Berlin or access to the city.

The letters exchanged at the time of the Soviet-East German treaty of 20 September said that East Germany would "exercise guard and control functions" along the zonal and sector borders and in Berlin, while control over Allied military traffic to Berlin was reserved to the Soviet authorities. According to press reports, General Dibrova stated that the transfer of authority over East Berlin to the East German regime had occurred during Foreign Minister Molotov's stop in Berlin on 17 and 18 November on the way home from the Geneva foreign ministers' conference.

East Gerr	man administrative organs have
been exercising gradually inc	creasing control over those of
the East Berlin government.	
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2. RESIGNATION OF TURKISH CABINET

The resignation of the Turkish cabinet on 29 November, immediately following the censure of Acting Foreign Minister Zorlu, the minister of economy, and the finance minister during a Democratic Party "caucus," reflects growing popular discontent with the government's economic program. Prime Minister Menderes, who has been asked to form a new cabinet, may have encouraged the party's criticism of these three ministers in order to shift responsibility from

criticism in the Grand National Assembly.

Turkish legislators have been concerned over the sharp rise in the cost of living and have called for counterinflationary measures. Several deputies have strongly criticized the government for its lack of economic planning and its neglect of current needs in favor of long-term investment.

himself for Turkey's economic deterioration and to forestall

Deputies who have recently returned from the provinces have heatedly criticized the shortage of essential commodities, indicating for the first time that the peasant population, which is the primary basis of Menderes' political strength, has been affected by Turkey's worsening economic situation.

Menderes' new cabinet will probably con-
tain many of his former ministers. The prime minister will
probably now make revisions in his economic program
in an attempt to speed negotiations aimed at getting a long-
sought American loan.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 30 November) 25X1A 25X1A No significant military activity has	
No significant infinitally activity has	057/4
been reported in the past 24 hours.	25X1
	25X1
The presence of five Egyptian jet	
fighters (British Meteors) and a C-47 transport at	
Damascus airport has been confirmed	25X1
This is the first indication that the	
joint Egyptian-Syrian command is starting to operate	
on a working level.	051/44
	25X1A
Egyptian minister of war Amir ar-	
rived in Jordan from Damascus for a three-day visit on	
30 November. The purpose of Amir's visit is not known,	
but he will probably try to persuade Jordan to join an ar-	
rangement similar to the ones Egypt now has with Syria and Saudi Arabia for the co-ordination of Arab military	

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action against Israel.

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BIWEEKLY SUMMARY 17-30 November 1955

THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Problem

25X1A	1. After a lull of several weeks in artillery duels in the Quemoy area, Chinese Nationalist 155mm howitzers on 28 November fired 240 rounds at a causeway which the Chinese Communists are constructing between the mainland and Tateng Island, four to five miles north of Quemoy. Communist artillery responded with 680 rounds. No major damage was reported.	
	2. The Chinese Communists began constructing the 6,300-foot causeway to Tateng apparently early in November. Such a link with the mainland would facilitate supply of Communist military positions on Tateng. Communist artillery now on the island is believed to include only 76mm guns, but 122mm or larger weapons could take any point on Quemoy under fire.	
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	ē.	6. Construction of Fukien Province's first rail line, from Yingtan to Amoy, is apparently proceeding rapidly.	0	FV4
25X1		Since grading work has been in progress for several months on the northern two thirds of the 400-mile line, it is now believed the Communists can complete the entire project by the end of 1956. This would be in advance of the timetable recently announced by Peiping.		5X1
		7. The only major Chinese Communist pronouncement on the Taiwan issue during the period was a statement by Vice Premier Chen Yi published in the East German press on 24 November. Chen remarked that there were two possible solutions to the question of Taiwanwithdrawal of US forces or "liberation" by military force. Chen stated that Peiping preferred a peaceful solution but realized that it must be prepared for action. He enumerated specific preparations for an invasion, including new airfields, new rail-	25)	X1A
	25X1A	roads in Fukien, and construction of ships for amphibious operations.	2:	5X1
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